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Abstract
We introduce a procedure in which two trusted individuals, Alice and Bob, may share a secret
matrix K from the non-abelian group GLn(Fq). In this procedure, the matrix K is concealed
from an eavesdropper, Eve, by a sequence of conjugations by elements from a pre-determined
abelian subgroup of GLn(Fq). We demonstrate that the group C∗n(Fq) of invertible circulant
matrices is one abelian subgroup that may be able to withstand a brute force attack. To
analyze this we need a technique to determine the order of C∗n(Fq), and to do this we make
use of a well-known isomorphism between the rings Cn(Fq) and Fq[x]/〈xn − 1〉. After we show
empirically that the order of C∗n(Fq) increases exponentially in n with q fixed, we will give a
universal lower bound on the order of this group to prove this mathematically as well.
1 Introduction
1.1 Massey-Omura Background
Non-commutative cryptography is the area of cryptography where the cryptographic systems are
based on algebraic structures which are non-commutative. Traditional cryptography has always
used commutative groups and rings, but now non-commutative structures are starting to be used
in encryption procedures [3]. Non-commutative cryptography has been an area of research in the
cryptographic community since the early 2000’s because this cryptography might have an advantage
over traditional cryptography since the commutative structures may be easier to break than the
non-commutative structures, though this has not yet been proved true or false. No one has used
these non-commutative structures in practice because no one is sure of the security and complexity
of these algebraic structures in encryption procedures. But the hope is that the non-commutativity
makes the algebraic calculations harder for an eavesdropper, and therefore increases the security of
the system.
One of these encryption systems that uses commutative structures is the Massey-Omura cryp-
tosystem, which uses the commutativity of integer exponentiation for encryption and decryption
[2]. In the traditional procedure, Alice picks the public abelian group Z∗p, and she picks the plain-
text m as an element of Z∗p, where p is a prime number. Alice selects elements eA and dA from
the public group so that eAdA = 1 mod (p − 1). Likewise, Bob selects elements eB and dB from
the public group so that eBdB = 1 mod (p − 1). Alice first computes meA mod p and sends this
to Bob. Bob then computes (meA)eB = meAeB mod p and sends this to Alice. Alice then encrypts
to the ciphertext c = meAeBdA mod p and sends this to Bob. Bob finally decrypts to the plaintext
m = meAeBdAdB = meAdAeBdB = m1 = m mod p by Euler’s Theorem. Euler’s Theorem states that
exponents of integers modulo a positive integer n are calculated modulo φ(n), which is the number
of integers from 1 to n that are coprime with n. Since we are taking the exponents modulo a prime
number p, φ(p) = p − 1 because p is the only number that is not coprime to p, which is why we
let eAdA = 1 mod (p − 1) and eBdB = 1 mod (p − 1). The purpose of this research is to consider
using non-commutative structures like that of matrix multiplication for concealing and revealing
a secret matrix. We will do this by replacing the integer exponentiation of this procedure with
matrix conjugation in our new procedure.
Old Massey-Omura Our Massey-Omura
commutative group: Z∗p non-commutative group: GLn(Fq)
integer plaintext: m from the group matrix plaintext: K from the group
session keys: eA and dA session keys: A and A
−1
integer exponentation: m→ meA matrix conjugation: K → A−1KA
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1.2 Procedure
We now show how we will convert integer exponentiation in the group Z∗p to matrix conjugation in
the group GLn(Fq) in our procedure.
Assumption: Suppose Alice and Bob have a method for selecting private matrices A and B
so that AB = BA and so that Alice does not know Bob’s B and Bob does not know Alice’s A.
Abstract Procedure: Suppose that Alice wants to send Bob a private matrix K from the
public non-abelian group GLn(Fq) of n × n invertible matrices with entries from a finite field
Fq. Alice picks a private matrix A and Bob picks a private matrix B according to the preceding
assumption. Alice and Bob can encrypt and decrypt K over an open line according to the following
procedure:
1. Alice finds the conjugate of A on K by calculating M1 = K
A = A−1KA, and she sends the
conjugate M1 to Bob.
2. Bob finds the conjugate of B on M1 by calculating M2 = M
B
1 = B
−1M1B, and he sends the
conjugate M2 to Alice.
3. Alice finds the conjugate of A−1 on M2 by calculating M3 = MA
−1
2 = AM2A
−1, and she
sends the congujate M3 to Bob.
4. Bob finds the conjugate of B−1 on M3 by calculating MB
−1
3 = BM3B
−1, and he gets the
plaintext matrix K.
A common analogy for this type of encryption in this procedure is the “box and locks” analogy.
In this analogy, Alice puts her secret matrix K in a box, then she puts her own lock on the box
and locks it with her matrix A, and she sends the box to Bob. Bob then puts his own lock on the
box and locks it with his matrix B, and he sends the box back to Alice. Alice then takes her own
lock off of the box with her matrix A−1, and she sends the box back to Bob. Bob then takes his
own lock off of the box with his matrix B−1, and he can now get K out of the box. But if Eve ever
stole the box, then she could never steal K from the box because she can unlock neither Alice’s
lock nor Bob’s lock.
Proposition 1.1. In this procedure, the plaintext matrix K can always be recovered as long as the
private matrices A and B commute.
Proof. Let Alice pick a private element K from the public non-abelian group GLn(Fq) and a private
element A according to the previous method. Let Bob also pick a private element B according to
the previous method.
1. Alice calculates the conjugate M1 = K
A = A−1KA, and she sends M1 to Bob.
2. Bob calculates the conjugate M2 = M
B
1 = B
−1M1B, and he sends M2 to Alice.
3. Alice calculates the conjugate M3 = M
A−1
2 = AM2A
−1, and she sends M3 to Bob.
4. Bob calculates the conjugate K = MB
−1
3 = BM3B
−1, and he finds Alice’s plaintext K.
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To prove that Bob recovers the plaintext K, we compute the following:
BM3B
−1 = B(AM2A−1)B−1
= BA(B−1M1B)A−1B−1
= BAB−1(A−1KA)BA−1B−1
= ABB−1A−1KBAA−1B−1 ← (AB = BA)
= AA−1KBB−1
= K.
Thus the plaintext matrix K can be recovered as long as the private matrices A and B commute.
Example 1.2. Suppose Alice picks the private element K from the public non-abelian group
GL3(F101) and the private element A with the method so that AB = BA, and Alice does not know
Bob’s secret matrix B. Suppose Bob also picks the private element B with the method so that AB
= BA, and Bob does not know Alice’s secret matrix A. The matrices K, A, and B are defined as
follows:
K =
17 62 1052 26 14
98 81 51

A =
79 83 2323 79 83
83 23 79
 B =
87 63 9393 87 63
63 93 87

AB =
83 96 3333 83 96
96 33 83
 = BA.
Here are the steps for encryption and decryption:
1. Alice computes the conjugate matrix:
M1 = A
−1KA =
72 66 5858 72 66
66 58 72
17 62 1052 26 14
98 81 51
79 83 2323 79 83
83 23 79
 =
74 75 5954 94 71
28 30 27

2. Bob computes the conjugate matrix:
M2 = B
−1M1B =
19 15 3535 19 15
15 35 19
74 75 5954 94 71
28 30 27
87 63 9393 87 63
63 93 87
 =
27 3 1768 21 6
64 58 46

3. Alice computes the conjugate matrix:
M3 = AM2A
−1 =
79 83 2323 79 83
83 23 79
27 3 1768 21 6
64 58 46
72 66 5858 72 66
66 58 72
 =
84 13 5199 28 33
27 94 83

3
4. Bob recovers the secret matrix:
K = BM3B
−1 =
87 63 9393 87 63
63 93 87
84 13 5199 28 33
27 94 83
19 15 3535 19 15
15 35 19
 =
17 62 1052 26 14
98 81 51

We can see the K that Bob computed at the end is the same K that Alice selected at the start.
Question: How can Alice and Bob select their private matrices A and B so that AB = BA
without knowing each other’s matrices in the process?
Answer: Alice and Bob can select their private matrices A and B so that AB = BA and not
know each other’s matrices by selecting a public abelian subgroup C of GLn(Fq).
We propose the solution of Alice publishing an abelian subgroup C, and then Alice and Bob
independently picking their own private matrices A and B from the public group C. But this
solution produces more questions. How can Alice and Bob find such a C? How can Alice and Bob
find such a C that is large enough to hold up against a brute force attack? Moreover, how can
Alice and Bob find such a C that is safe enough to not suffer from other security issues? Generally,
what types of properties should a public abelian subgroup C have in order to make this secure?
In Example 1.2, we selected matrices A and B to be circulant matrices, which will be defined in
Definition 2.1. We will see that the group of invertible circulants is an abelian subgroup of the
general linear group that can be implemented in our procedure. We will investigate the more
important question, which is whether the group of invertible circulants should be implemented in
our procedure.
2 Circulant Matrices
We will now talk about the properties of circulant matrices over fields to show that they can be
implemented in our procedure.
Definition 2.1. A circulant matrix C is an n× n matrix where each row is the prior row shifted
one position to the right, so that C takes the form:
C =

c1 c2 · · · cn
cn c1 · · · cn−1
...
...
. . .
...
c2 c3 · · · c1
 .
A circulant matrix C is completely determined by its first row, and thus the matrix C above can
be represented as
[
c1 c2 · · · cn
]†
. The set of all n × n circulant matrices with entries over the
field F will be denoted as Cn(F). We wish to prove that the set of all invertible circulant matrices
over a field is an abelian subgroup of the general linear group over the same field. This will show
that the group of circulant matrices can be implemented as the public abelian subgroup of GLn(Fq)
in our procedure. In order to do this, it will be convenient to consider the ring structure of the
set of all circulant matrices over a field. We want to prove that the set of all circulant matrices
over a field is a commutative ring with identity, which will show that the multiplication of circulant
matrices is commutative. We will first prove that the set of all circulant matrices over a field is an
abelian group under matrix addition, then prove that it is a vector space, and lastly prove that it
is a commutative ring. Once we prove that Cn(F) is a commutative ring with identity, we will look
at its group of units under multiplication.
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2.1 Vector Space Structure of Circulant Matrices
It is clear that Cn(F) is closed under matrix addition because two circulant matrices added together
is a circulant matrix with elements that are the sum of the respective elements of the two matrices.
We can also see that addition in Cn(F) is associative and commutative because the addition of all
matrices is associative and commutative. It is also clear that Cn(F) has the additive identity propery
because all circulant matrices added to the zero matrix will be the same circulant matrices, and the
zero matrix is also a circulant matrix. We can also see that Cn(F) is closed under additive inverses
because all circulant matrices added to the negative of their matrices will be the zero matrix, and
this inverse matrix is also a circulant matrix. Therefore, the set of all circulant matrices over a
field is an abelian group under matrix addition.
It is clear that Cn(F) is closed under scalar multiplication because a circulant matrix multiplied
by a scalar will be another circulant matrix with elements that are the products of each element
and the scalar. Therefore, the set of all circulant matrices over a field is a vector space with scalars
from the field. We can also see that if these scalars are from the finite field Fq, then Cn(Fq) has
qn elements and has dimension n. This is because a circulant matrix is determined by its first row
and there are q options for each of the n entries in the first row. We want to find a convenient basis
for this vector space since it will help us understand its ring structure, and to find this set we will
look at Example 2.2.
Example 2.2. Let C be the element
[
4 2 6
]†
of C3(Z7), the set of all 3 × 3 circulant matrices
with entries from the field Z7. Consider the circulant matrix C. Note that:
C =
4 2 66 4 2
2 6 4
 =
4 0 00 4 0
0 0 4
+
0 2 00 0 2
2 0 0
+
0 0 66 0 0
0 6 0
 =
4
1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
+ 2
0 1 00 0 1
1 0 0
+ 6
0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0
 .
Therefore, {[1 0 0]† , [0 1 0]† , [0 0 1]†} is a basis for the vector space C3(Z7).
Likewise, {[1 0 · · · 0]† , [0 1 · · · 0]† , · · · , [0 0 · · · 1]†} is a basis of n elements for
any n×n circulant. It turns out that the matrices of this basis are all powers of the second matrix[
0 1 · · · 0]†. The first matrix [1 0 · · · 0]† is the identity matrix, so it is the second matrix
to the zeroth power. The next matrix
[
0 1 · · · 0]† is the original matrix, so it is the second
matrix to the first power. The nth matrix
[
0 0 · · · 1]† is the second matrix to the (n − 1)st
power. And it turns out that this second matrix is a cyclic permutation matrix.
Definition 2.3. Let the cyclic permutation matrix, P , be the element of Cn(F) with first row[
0 1 · · · 0]. For every row i and every column j in the matrix P , only the entries ai,i+1 are a
1, and all other entries ai,j are a 0, so:
P =

0 1 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 · · · 0
 .
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Proposition 2.4. Let x ≥ 0 be an integer. The matrix P x is a n× n circulant matrix that shifts
every row of the identity matrix x spaces to the right, where the exponent x is interpreted mod n.
For every row i and every column j in the matrix P x, only the entries ai,i+x are a 1 and all other
entries ai,j are a 0.
Proof. For the base case, P 0 is the identity matrix because any square matrix to the zero power
is the identity matrix. And P 0 is a circulant matrix so that only the entries ai,i+0 are a 1 and all
other entries ai,j are a 0, so the proposition is true for P
0. Of course, it is also true for P 1. For all
other cases, assume that the proposition is true for P k, then P k is a circulant matrix of the stated
form. Then P k+1 = PP k. Suppose the entries of P are ai,j and the entries of P
k are bi,j . We
want to show that only the entries ci,i+k+1 in the matrix P
k+1 are a 1. We know that ai,i+1 = 1
for every row i of matrix P by the previous definition and bj−k,j = 1 for every column j of matrix
P k by the previous assumption. We also know from the definition of matrix multiplication that
the entries ci,j will be a 1 when ai,m and bm,j are a 1 for some m, and all other entries will be a 0.
Thus ci,j =
∑n
m=1 ai,mbm,j = 1 when m = i + 1 = j − k, thus j = i + k + 1. Therefore, P k+1 is a
circulant matrix so that for every row i and every column j, only the entries ci,i+k+1 are a 1, and
all other entries ci,j are a 0, so the proposition is true for P
k+1 if it is true for P k. By mathematical
induction, we are done.
Note. The matrix Pn is an n×n circulant that shifts every row of the identity matrix n spaces to
the right. The identity matrix is an n× n matrix, so shifting n− 1 spaces to the right is the same
as shifting 1 space to the left, and n − 1 = −1 mod n. Also, shifting n spaces to the right is the
same as shifting no spaces at all, and n = 0 mod n. Thus Pn = I, and this is why the exponents
must be interpreted mod n.
In light of Example 2.2, Proposition 2.4 immediately gives the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5. Every circulant matrix C in Cn(F) can be uniquely expressed as a linear combina-
tion of powers of P in the following way:
C =

c1 c2 · · · cn
cn c1 · · · cn−1
...
...
. . .
...
c2 c3 · · · c1
 = c1I + c2P + c3P 2 + · · ·+ cnPn−1.
Corollary 2.6. The set {I, P, P 2, . . . , Pn−1} of powers of the cyclic permutation matrix P forms
a basis for the vector space of all n× n circulant matrices over a field F.
Proposition 2.7. The set of all circulant matrices over a field F is closed under matrix multipli-
cation.
Proof. Let C and D be n × n circulant matrices over F so that C = [c1 c2 · · · cn]† and D =[
d1 d2 · · · dn
]†
. Then C = c1I + c2P + c3P
2 + · · · + cnPn−1 and D = d1I + d2P + d3P 2 +
· · ·+ dnPn−1. Thus CD = (c1I + c2P + c3P 2 + · · ·+ cnPn−1)(d1I + d2P + d3P 2 + · · ·+ dnPn−1) =
x1I+x2P+x3P
2+· · ·+xnPn−1 for some coefficients xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n after combining the coefficients
in polynomials C and D. This is a closed operation because all of the coefficients are elements of
the field. Thus CD is also a circulant matrix because the multiplication of polynomials over a field
is closed. This is because we will make repeated use of reducing the powers of P mod n.
Proposition 2.8. Let C be an invertible circulant matrix in Cn(F). Then its inverse is also a
circulant matrix in Cn(F).
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Proof. Let C be an invertible circulant with det(C) 6= 0 and with entries over a field F. Suppose
that its characteristic polynomial is:
p(x) = det(xI − C) = anxn + an−1xn−1 + · · ·+ a1x+ a0
where a0 = (−1)n det(C) 6= 0. Then the Cayley-Hamilton Theorem states that
anC
n + an−1Cn−1 + · · ·+ a1C + a0I = 0.
We can see from this that
I = − 1
a0
(anC
n + an−1Cn−1 + · · ·+ a1C),
which shows us that
C−1 = − 1
a0
(anC
n−1 + an−1Cn−2 + · · ·+ a1I).
But circulants are closed under scalar multiplication, matrix multiplication, and matrix addition,
so C−1 is a circulant because C was a circulant.
We now know that the inverse of an invertible circulant is a circulant, and we have a formula
for finding the inverse of a circulant. We will now look at an example with a 3×3 circulant matrix.
Example 2.9. Let C =
[
1 2 3
]†
be an element of C3(F97). The determinant of C is 18, so C is
invertible. Then the characteristic polynomial of C with the coefficients calculated modulo 97 is:
p(x) = x3 − 3x2 − 15x− 18 = x3 + 94x2 + 82x+ 79.
The Cayley-Hamilton Theorem states that:
p(C) = C3 + 94C2 + 82C + 79I = 0.
We can see from this that
I =
−1
79
(C3 + 94C2 + 82C),
which shows us that
C−1 = 27(C2 + 94C + 82I) = 27C2 + 16C + 80I =[
60 60 76
]†
+
[
16 32 48
]†
+
[
80 0 0
]†
=
[
59 92 27
]†
.
When we calculate C−1 in Mathematica, the result is
[
59 92 27
]†
, so the formula is correct.
Proposition 2.8 will be important in the following section, when we prove that the set of all
invertible circulants in the ring Cn(F) is also a group C∗n(F).
2.2 Ring Structure of Circulant Matrices
We will now prove that the set of all circulant matrices over a field is a commutative ring with
identity.
Proposition 2.10. The set of all circulant matrices over a field F is a ring with identity.
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Proof. Let Cn(F) be the set of all n × n circulant matrices over a field F. We have previously
established that Cn(F) has all of the properties of an abelian group under matrix addition. By
Proposition 2.7, matrix multiplication is a closed operation on Cn(F). Therefore, Cn(F) inherits the
multiplicative associativity, the multiplicative identity, and the left and right distributive properties.
We have now proved that the set of all circulant matrices over a field is a ring with identity.
But we have yet to prove that the set of all circulant matrices over a field is a commutative ring
with identity. While many of the previous properties of the ring of circulant matrices have been
clear, this is not true of all its properties. Is it true that the multiplication of a circluant matrix
with another circulant matrix is commutative? We will prove that this ring has this property with
the following propositions.
Proposition 2.11. There is an onto ring homomorphism from the ring F[x] of polynomials over
the field F to the ring Cn(F) of circulants over the field F.
Proof. Let the map α : F[x]→ Cn(F) be α(f(x)) = f(P ), so for every polynomial f(x) = a0+a1x1+
a2x
2+· · ·+amxm in the ring of polynomials, α(f(x)) = f(P ) = a0I+a1P+a2P 2+· · ·+amPm in the
ring of circulants. We want to show that α is an onto homomorphism. According to Corollary 2.5,
every circulant can be uniquely expressed as a polynomial in such a form. Therefore, for every
element of the ring of circulants, there is an element of the ring of polynomials that α maps to that
circulant. Thus, α is onto. We also want to show that α is a ring homomorphism.
Let f(x) = a0 + a1x
1 + a2x
2 + · · ·+ amxm and g(x) = b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + · · ·+ bkxk be elements
of the ring of polynomials. We wish to show that α(f(x) + g(x)) = α(f(x)) + α(g(x)). The
variables of the two polynomials are the same because the exponents of P are collected in the
same way as the exponents of x since these exponents are interpreted mod m. The coefficients
are also the same because the coefficients of the P polynomial are combined in the same way as
the coefficients of the x polynomial since these coefficients are from the same field. Thus, the
two polynomials are the same, so α(f(x) + g(x)) = α(f(x)) + α(g(x)) is true. We also wish to
show that α(f(x) × g(x)) = α(f(x)) × α(g(x)). The variables of the two polynomials are the
same because the exponents of P are calculated in the same way as the exponents of x since
the exponents are interpreted mod m. The coefficients of the two polynomials are also the same
because the coefficients of the P polynomial are multiplied in the same way as the coefficients of
the x polynomial since the coefficients are from the same field. Thus, the two polynomials are the
same, so α(f(x)× g(x)) = α(f(x))× α(g(x)) is true. Therefore, α is a ring homomorphism. Thus,
α is an onto ring homomorphisn from the ring of polynomials to the ring of circulants.
This onto ring homomorphism between the ring of polynomials and the ring of circulants proves
that the commutativity of multiplication of circulants is inherited from the commutativity of mul-
tiplication of polynomials. But for a more comprehensive understanding, we will remind the reader
of some facts about the ring F[x] of polynomials over the field F:
• In F[x], every ideal is a principal ideal, so every ideal I is generated by some polynomial g(x).
• In F[x], a generator g(x) of I is any element of the ideal I that is a polynomial of least degree.
• In F[x], the generator g(x) is unique if it is chosen to be monic.
For proof of these facts, refer to [1, Section 8.1, Proposition 1]. We have now proved that there
is an onto homomorphism between the ring of polynomials and the ring of circulants. We next
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want to prove that this homomorphism induces an isomorphism via quotients, but to do this we
need to find the kernel of our function α. We will prove that 〈xn − 1〉 is the kernel of our function
α in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.12. Given the homomorphism α : F[x] → Cn(F) as in Proposition 2.11, xn − 1 is
the unique monic polynomial of least possible degree in the kernel of α.
Proof. Recall that the function α : F[x] → Cn(F) is defined as α(f(x)) = f(P ). The kernel of the
function is an ideal of F[x], so the kernel must be generated by some polynomial g(x) in F[x]. If
ker(α) = 〈g(x)〉, then g(x) is an element of the kernel of α that is a polynomial of minimum degree.
We will now show that the polynomial xn− 1 generates the kernel. Since Pn = I, Pn− I = 0, so if
g(x) = xn− 1, α(g(x)) = g(P ) = Pn− I = 0. We have now shown that xn− 1 is an element of the
kernel, but we still need to show that xn− 1 has minimum degree among all elements of the kernel.
Suppose f(x) is a non-zero element of ker(α) of degree less than n; this will lead to a contradiction.
Then f(x) = a0 + a1x
1 + a2x
2 + · · ·+ anxn−1 6= 0 so that α(f(x)) = f(P ) = 0. If f(P ) = 0, then
a0P
0 + a1P
1 + a2P
2 + · · ·+ an−1Pn−1 = 0. Therefore, we have:
f(P ) =

a0 a1 · · · an−1
an−1 a0 · · · an−2
...
...
. . .
...
a1 a2 · · · a0
 =

0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0
 .
Then a0 = a1 = a2 = · · · = an−1 = 0, thus f(x) = 0 + 0x1 + 0x2 + · · · 0xn−1 = 0. But f(x) has to
be a nonzero polynomial by assumption, so there is no nonzero polynomial in the kernel of degree
less than n. Thus, g(x) = xn − 1 is the polynomial of least possible degree in the kernel of α, so
ker(α) = 〈xn − 1〉.
Theorem 2.13 (Fundamental Homomorphism Theorem). If there is a ring homormorphism f :
A→ B from ring A onto ring B and if K is the kernel of f , then there is a ring isomorphism from
A/K onto B.
Corollary 2.14. There is a ring isomorphism from the ring F[x]/〈xn − 1〉 onto Cn(F).
Since the multiplication of two polynomials is commutative, the isomorphism between the ring
of circulants and this quotient of the ring of polynomials proves that the multiplication of two
circulants is commutative. We have now proved that the set of all circulant matrices over a field F
is a commutative ring with identity.
Proposition 2.15. The set R∗ of invertible elements in a ring R with identity is also a group
under multiplication.
Proof. A unit multiplied with another unit equals a unit in any group. Thus the set of all invertible
elements, or units, in a ring with identity is also a group.
Definition 2.16. Let C∗n(F) be the set of all n × n invertible circulant matrices with entries over
the field F.
Corollary 2.17. The set C∗n(F) of invertible circulants in the ring Cn(F) is an abelian subgroup of
GLn(F).
Convention 2.18. For the set Cn(Fq) of all n × n circulant matrices over a finite field Fq, n ≥ 2
will always be a positive integer and q ≥ 2 will always be a power of a prime number p.
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We can now use the group C∗n(Fq) of invertible circulants as the public abelian subgroup of the
group GLn(Fq) in our encryption procedure.
Concrete Procedure: Suppose that Alice wants to send Bob a plaintext matrix K from the
public non-abelian group GLn(Fq). Alice picks a private matrix A and Bob picks a private
matrix B from the public abelian subgroup C∗n(Fq) independently. Alice and Bob can encrypt
and decrypt K over an open line according to the following procedure:
1. Alice finds the conjugate of K by A by calculating M1 = A
−1KA, and she sends the
conjugate M1 to Bob.
2. Bob finds the conjugate of M1 by B by calculating M2 = B
−1M1B, and he sends the
conjugate M2 to Alice.
3. Alice finds the conjugate of M2 by A
−1 by calculating M3 = AM2A−1, and she sends the
congujate M3 to Bob.
4. Bob finds the conjugate of M3 by B
−1 by calculating BM3B−1, and he gets the plaintext
K.
Just the fact that we can use circulant matrices in our procedure does not mean that we should
use circulant matrices. The mathematical complexity of our procedure is based on the conjugacy
search problem [3]. The complexity of this problem depends on the groups in question, and it
seems that not much is known about the complexity of the conjugacy search problem in GLn(Fq).
The question of this problem in the group GLn(Fq) is: for S = X−1TX where S and T are public
and X and thus X−1 are private, is it possible for an eavesdropper to find out what X or X−1
is? Since the complexity of the conjugacy search problem is not known for GLn(Fq), we cannot
find out if our procedure is vulnerable to attacks that depend on it. But we can find out if our
procedure is vulnerable to a known ciphertext attack or a brute force attack. The other standard
message attacks reduce to the conjugacy search problem, so we cannot know if our procedure is
vulnerable to them. We will now consider the weakest of the standard message attacks, which is
the known ciphertext attack.
2.3 Message Attacks on the Protocol
What can Eve discover by observing only the information that is public? Let’s evaluate the security
of all three passes in our three-pass protocol in order to examine its baseline security. The terms
that are public to Eve will be underlined.
1. Alice finds the conjugate of K by A by calculating M1 = A
−1KA, and she sends the conjugate
M1 over an open line; thus, the only public matrix in this pass is M1:
M1 = A
−1KA⇒ AM1 = KA⇒ AM1 −KA = 0.
Eve can’t use this last identity to solve for the private matrices A or K in the first pass
because this pass results in a non-linear system. Because K and A are not public in this
pass, if Eve wrote out all n2 equations in terms of the variable entries of K and A, then the
KA term would have quadratic entries. Thus, Eve can’t solve this system with linear algebra
methods.
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2. Bob finds the conjugate of M1 by B by calculating M2 = B
−1M1B, and he sends the conjugate
M2 over an open line; thus, the public matrices in this pass are M1 and M2:
M2 = B
−1M1B ⇒ BM2 = M1B ⇒ BM2 −M1B = 0.
Eve can use the last identity to solve for some private matrix B in the second pass because
this pass results in a linear system, but the true test is if she can solve for Bob’s B. If Eve
followed the previous technique, then this will lead to a solvable linear system. Thus, Eve can
solve this system with linear algebra methods, but there will be multiple solutions. If Eve
finds some matrix E that solves the system like matrix B, then Eve still cannot necessarily
find the matrix K when she acts as Bob because E is not guaranteed to conjugate the same
way that B does. Even if Eve does guess the secret matrix K she can’t check to see if her
guess is right. Let’s consider the substitution of Eve’s matrix E for Bob’s matrix B in the
third pass:
EM3E
−1 = EAM2A−1E−1 = · · · = EB−1KBE−1 = K if E = B.
Let’s try to act as Eve in Example 1.2 by trying to solve for B in BM2 −M1B = 0:
if
b1 b2 b3b3 b1 b2
b2 b3 b1
27 3 1768 21 6
64 58 46
−
74 75 5954 94 71
28 30 27
b1 b2 b3b3 b1 b2
b2 b3 b1
 =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0

then B =
b1 b2 b3b3 b1 b2
b2 b3 b1
 =
27b3 30b3 b3b3 27b3 30b3
30b3 b3 27b3
 =
87 63 9393 87 63
63 93 87
 when b3 = 93.
3. Alice finds the conjugate of M2 by A
−1 by calculating M3 = AM2A−1, and she sends the
congujate M3 over an open line; thus, the public matrices in this pass are M2 and M3:
M3 = AM2A
−1 ⇒M3A = AM2 ⇒M3A−AM2 = 0.
Eve can use the last identity to solve for some private matrix A in the third pass because this
pass also results in a linear system, but the true test is if she can solve for Alice’s A. If Eve
followed the previous technique, then this will lead to a solvable linear system. Thus, Eve can
solve this system with linear algebra methods, but there will be multiple solutions. If Eve
finds some matrix D that solves for the system like matrix A, then Eve still cannot necessarily
find the matrix K when she acts as Alice because D is not guaranteed to conjugate the same
way that A does. Even if Eve does guess the secret matrix K she can’t check to see if her
guess is right. Let’s consider the substitution of Eve’s matrix D for Alice’s matrix A in the
second pass:
BM3B
−1 = BDM2D−1B−1 = · · · = DA−1KAD−1 = K if D = A.
Let’s try to act as Eve in Example 1.2 by trying to solve for A in M3A−AM2 = 0:
if
84 13 5199 28 33
27 94 83
a1 a2 a3a3 a1 a2
a2 a3 a1
−
a1 a2 a3a3 a1 a2
a2 a3 a1
27 3 1768 21 6
64 58 46
 =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0

then A =
a1 a2 a3a3 a1 a2
a2 a3 a1
 =
21a3 8a3 a3a3 21a3 8a3
8a3 a3 21a3
 =
79 83 2323 79 83
83 23 79
 when a3 = 23.
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We have now shown that our procedure is likely not vulnerable to the weakest message attack.
We will now look at the next weakest attack, which is a brute force attack. Can an eavesdropper
just search through all the possible private keys via a guess-and-check method? To consider this
method of attack, we will need to count the number of elements in C∗n(Fq), or the order of the group
C∗n(Fq), for different parameters of n and q.
3 Order of the Group of Invertible Circulants
3.1 Ring Theory Background
We know that we can use the group of invertible circulants as the abelian subgroup of GLn(Fq)
in our procedure. We also know that our procedure with circulants is probably not vulnerable to
standard message attacks. But we will need to count the number of invertible circulants in the
group to see if our procedure is vulnerable to a brute force attack, and we hope that these counts
are very large. To calculate the number of invertible circulants, we will need to remind the reader
about rings, ideals, and polynomials over a field.
Definition 3.1. Let R be a commutative ring with the identity element 1 and let I and J be ideals
of R. The ideals I and J are coprime if there is an element i of I and an element j of J so that
i+ j = 1.
We will need this definition so that we can use the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Chinese Remainder Theorem). Let I1, I2, . . . , Im be ideals in the commutative ring
with identity R. The map pi: R→ R/I1×R/I2×· · ·×R/Im defined as pi(r) = (r+I1, r+I2, . . . , r+
Im) is a ring homomorphism with kernel I1 ∩ I2 ∩ · · · ∩ Im. If for each x, y with 1 ≤ x, y ≤ m and
x 6= y the ideals Ix and Iy are coprime, then this map is onto, so:
R/(I1 ∩ I2 ∩ · · · ∩ Im) ∼= R/I1 ×R/I2 × · · · ×R/Im.
The Chinese Remainder Theorem is a standard theorem in ring theory. For a proof of this result,
refer to [1, Section 7.6, Theorem 17]. We have now shown that the ring R/I1 ×R/I2 × · · · ×R/Im
is isomorphic to the ring R/ker(pi), by the Fundamental Homomorphism Theorem. We have also
shown that ker(pi) =
⋂m
k=1 Ik, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. We also know that the ring
Cn(Fq) is isomorphic to the ring Fq[x]/ker(α) and ker(α) = 〈xn − 1〉, by Corollary 2.14. We wish
to know the number of elements in the group C∗n(Fq), but this is a difficult question to answer.
We do know that the number of elements in Cn(Fq) is the same as the number of elements in
Fq[x]/〈xn−1〉 because of the isomorphism of Proposition 2.12. But we cannot calculate the number
of units in the ring Fq[x]/〈xn − 1〉 until we get the direct product of rings as distinct irreducible
factors of the polynomial xn − 1 over Fq. When we find the distinct irreducible factors of this
polynomial, the ideals of these factors will be coprime. We can then use the Chinese Remainder
Theorem to find the number of units in this direct product is the same as the number of units in
the ring Fq[x]/〈xn − 1〉, which is the number of elements in the group C∗n(Fq).
Definition 3.3. Let f(x) and g(x) be any polynomials over the field F. Then f(x) and g(x) are
distinct if g(x) and f(x) are not constant multiples of each other so g(x) 6= cf(x) for any constant
c in F.
Proposition 3.4. If f1(x) and f2(x) are distinct irreducible polynomials in F[x], then the ideals
〈f1(x)〉 and 〈f2(x)〉 are coprime.
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Proof. Let’s look at the set I = {af1(x)+ bf2(x) | a, b are in F[x]}. It is clear that I is an ideal that
is nonzero; therefore, there is an element g(x) in I of minimum degree that generates I. Because
I = 〈g(x)〉, by the definition of generators every element of I is a multiple of g(x). Therefore, every
polynomial in I is a multiple of g(x), thus g(x) is a common divisor of f1(x) and f2(x) because
f1, f2 ∈ I. But f1(x) and f2(x) are irreducible polynomials, so their only divisors are nonzero
constants and constant multiples of themselves, so g(x) must be a constant or a constant multiple
of f1(x) and f2(x). If g(x) is a constant multiple, then g(x) = c1f1(x) = c2f2(x) for some c1, c2
in F. This means that f1(x) and f2(x) are not distinct because both polynomials are irreducible,
but this is a contradiction because f1(x) are f2(x) are distinct polynomials by assumption. Thus
g(x) is a nonzero constant, and therefore a unit. But g(x) is in I, and the only ideal that contains
a unit is F[x]. Thus I = F[x], and I must contain 1. Then there are polynomials a, b in F[x] with
af1(x) + bf2(x) = 1, thus 〈f1(x)〉 and 〈f2(x)〉 are coprime.
Definition 3.5. For any polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + · · ·+ anxn in F[x], the derivative
of f(x) is f ′(x) = a1 + 2a2x+ 3a3x2 + · · ·+ nanxn−1.
Definition 3.6. For any polynomial f(x) in F[x], a root x = c of f(x) in the field F is a repeated
root if the factor x − c has a power greater than one in the factorization of f(x); that is f(x) =
(x− c)kg(x) where k ≥ 2.
Proposition 3.7. If x = c is a root of the polynomial f(x) as an element of F[x], then x = c is a
repeated root if and only if x = c is a root of the derivative f ′(x).
Proof. If x = c is a repeated root of f(x), then f(x) = (x − c)kg(x), for k ≥ 2 where g(c) 6= 0.
Then f ′(x) = k(x − c)k−1g(x) + (x − c)kg′(x). Thus f ′(c) = k(c − c)k−1g(c) + (c − c)kg′(c) =
0g(c) + 0g′(c) = 0 + 0 = 0. This is because k − 1 is greater than or equal to 1 since k was greater
than or equal to 2. Therefore, if x = c is a repeated root of f(x), then x = c is root of f ′(x).
If x = c is a root of f(x) and f ′(x), then f(x) = (x − c)kg(x), for k ≥ 1 and g(c) 6= 0. If
k = 1, then f(x) = (x− c)g(x) and f ′(x) = g(x) + (x− c)g′(x). Thus f ′(c) = g(c) + (c− c)g′(c) =
g(c) + 0g′(c) = g(c) + 0 = g(c). Because x = c is a root of f ′(x), f ′(c) = 0 so g(c) = f ′(c) = 0. But
g(c) 6= 0, thus k is greater than 1. Therefore, if x = c is a root of f ′(x), then x = c is a repeated
root of f(x).
Let F be a field. If f(x) is any polynomial in F[x], then there is a field E that is an extension
of the field F in which f(x) has a root. The construction is a consequence of basic results in field
theory. This construction can be iterated to give what are called “splitting fields” [1, Section 13.4,
Definition].
Definition 3.8. An extension field E of the field F is a splitting field for the polynomial f(x) in
F[x] if f(x) factors completely into linear factors in E[x] and f(x) does not factor completely into
linear factors over any proper subfield of E containing F.
Theorem 3.9. For any field F, if f(x) is a polynomial in F[x], then there is an extension E of F
that is a splitting field for f(x).
For a proof of this theorem, refer to [1, Section 13.4, Theorem 25]. We want to see if there
are any repeated roots of the polynomial xn − 1 in any extension field of the field Fq. If we
want to get the direct product of rings as distinct irreducible factors of this polynomial, then
we can’t have any repeated roots in any extension fields because then we would have repeated
factors. If we want to use the Chinese Remainder Theorem on Fq[x]/〈xn − 1〉, we must have
coprime ideals in Fq[x], and to have this we must have distinct irreducible factors of xn − 1. For
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an example of repeated roots not in the original field but in an extension field, take the polynomial
f(x) = x4 + 2x + 1 = (x2 + 1)(x2 + 1) = (x + i)2(x − i)2. We can see that f(x) has no roots in
the field R, but it has two repeated roots, i and −i, in the extension field C. We know that a
polynomial in any field has all of its roots in an extension of that field, this is the splitting field. So
we need to make sure that the polynomial xn − 1 has no repeated roots in Fq or in any extension
of Fq.
Proposition 3.10. The polynomial f(x) = xn − 1 has no repeated roots over any extension of the
field Fq if and only if gcd(n, q) = 1.
Proof. Let gcd(n, q) = 1 and x = c be a root of f(x) = xn − 1. If x = c is a repeated root of
f(x) = xn − 1, then x = c is a root of f ′(x) = nxn−1. If x = c is a root of f ′(x), then f ′(c) = 0,
and f ′(x) = nxn−1 = 0. Therefore, because n is a unit xn−1 = 0, so x = 0 is the only root of f ′(x).
But x = 0 is not a root of f(x) because f(0) = 0n − 1 = −1. Then there is no x = c that is a root
of f(x) and f ′(x). Therefore, if gcd(n, q) = 1, then f(x) = xn − 1 has no repeated roots.
Let gcd(n, q) 6= 1, we want to show that f(x) has repeated roots. Let x = c be a root of
f(x) = xn − 1, we wish to show that x = c is also a root of f ′(x). Because gcd(n, q) 6= 1
and q = pd for some prime number p and positive integer d, n = pk for some integer k. Then
f ′(x) = nxn−1 = pkxpk−1. In any extension of the field Fpd , the characteristic of the field is p. For
a proof of this fact, refer to [1, Section 13.1, Proposition 1]. Then p = 0, so f ′(x) = 0(kx0(k)−1) = 0.
Thus, x = c is a root of f ′(x), so x = c is a repeated root of f(x). Therefore, if gcd(n, q) 6= 1, then
f(x) = xn − 1 has repeated roots, which is equivalent to the contrapositive that if f(x) = xn − 1
has no repeated roots, then gcd(n, q) = 1.
Theorem 3.11. The polynomial f(x) = xn − 1 factors into distinct irreducible polynomials over
the finite field Fq if and only if gcd(n, q) = 1.
Proof. Let gcd(n, q) = 1 and let’s say that the polynomial xn − 1 does not factor into distinct
irreducible polynomials over Fq, so at least one of these polynomials is repeated. Then without loss
of generality, xn − 1 = f1(x)f1(x)f2(x) · · · fk(x). If xn − 1 is passed to a splitting field, then the
repeated polynomial f1(x) has a root, so x
n− 1 has a repeated root. But this is a contradiction to
previous proposition. Therefore, xn − 1 factors into distinct irreducible polynomials.
Let xn − 1 factor into distinct irreducible polynomials over Fq. Let’s say that gcd(n, q) 6= 1.
Then by the previous proposition xn − 1 has repeated roots over some extension of Fq. If r is this
repeated root in the extension field, then x−r is a repeated irreducible factor in the polynomial. But
this is a contradiction because we assumed xn − 1 has only distinct irreducible factors. Therefore,
gcd(n, q) = 1.
3.2 Finding the Order
We can now calculate the number of invertible circulants in the group C∗n(Fq) when n and q are
coprime. Suppose that gcd(n, q) = 1. We know from Theorem 3.11 that:
xn − 1 = f1(x) · f2(x) · · · · fm(x)
where f1(x), f2(x), ..., fm(x) are distinct irreducible factors of x
n − 1. Then 〈xn − 1〉 = 〈f1(x)〉 ∩
〈f2(x)〉 ∩ · · · ∩ 〈fm(x)〉 where 〈f1(x)〉, 〈f2(x)〉, ..., 〈fm(x)〉 are coprime ideals of 〈xn − 1〉. Therefore
Fq[x]/〈xn−1〉 = Fq[x]/(〈f1(x)〉∩〈f2(x)〉∩· · ·∩〈fm(x)〉). Thus by the Chinese Remainder Theorem:
Cn(Fq) ∼= Fq[x]/〈xn − 1〉 ∼=
m∏
i=1
(Fq[x]/〈fi(x)〉).
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If we take the group of units of each side of the isomorphism, then we get the formula of the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.12. If gcd(n, q) = 1, then |C∗n(Fq)| =
m∏
i=1
(qdi − 1) where the di’s represent the degrees
of the m distinct irreducible factors of xn − 1.
Proof. Let gcd(n, q) = 1. Then Theorem 3.11 states that xn − 1 = f1(x) · f2(x) · · · · fm(x) where
f1(x), f2(x), ..., fm(x) are distinct irreducible factors of x
n − 1. Then Proposition 3.4 states that
〈f1(x)〉, 〈f2(x)〉, ..., 〈fm(x)〉 are coprime ideals of 〈xn − 1〉, so 〈xn − 1〉 = 〈f1(x)〉 ∩ 〈f2(x)〉 ∩ · · · ∩
〈fm(x)〉. Since each fi(x) is an irreducible factor, Fq[x]/〈fi(x)〉 is a field with size qdi where di
is the degree of the factor fi(x). But we want the group of units from this field, so we must
remove the zero element, and its size is qdi − 1. When we do this for each factor, we get Cn(Fq) ∼=
Fq[x]/〈xn − 1〉 ∼=
m∏
i=1
(Fq[x]/〈fi(x)〉), so |C∗n(Fq)| =
m∏
i=1
(qdi − 1).
Example 3.13. Let us calculate the number of invertible circulants in C∗9(F11). We can use the
formula of Theorem 3.12 because gcd(9, 11) = 1. We can use the computer program Mathematica
or Magma to factor the polynomial x9 − 1 into distinct irreducibles over the finite field F11. The
factorization is:
x9 − 1 = (x+ 10)(x2 + x+ 1)(x6 + x3 + 1)
and thus, d1 = 1, d2 = 2, d3 = 6. We then use the previous theorem to calculate the number of
invertible circulants in the group C∗9(F11):
|C∗9(F11)| = (111 − 1)(112 − 1)(116 − 1) ≈ 2.1× 109.
Let us take as a baseline threshold that Eve cannot successfully brute force a system with at
least 280 ≈ 1.2 × 1024 keys. This threshold is sometimes used as a low standard for the minimum
number of necessary keys in an encryption procedure. This baseline threshold does not guarantee
that an encryption procedure is not vulnerable to a brute force attack, but it is a starting point. If a
key is eighty bits (or ten bytes) long, then the keyspace has 280 keys, and this number estimates the
minimum number of keys needed in the keyspace. The mathematics of the encryption procedure
could also influence the minimum number of keys the cryptographer wants in the keyspace. We
want to know when our procedure will likely not be vulnerable to a brute force attack, so we wish to
find out when our keyspace has at least 280 keys in it. We will first look at the number of invertible
circulants in our procedure when q is constant at 2, and n is increased until |C∗n(F2)| ≥ 1.2× 1024.
When we carry out calculations as in Example 3.13, we get:
|C∗81(F2)| ≈ 8.9× 1023
|C∗83(F2)| ≈ 4.8× 1024
|C∗85(F2)| ≈ 1.7× 1025.
We remind the reader that we cannot calculate |C∗82(F2)| or |C∗84(F2)| with our formula because
gcd(82, 2) = 2 6= 1 and gcd(84, 2) = 2 6= 1. We can see that our procedure hits the threshold
number of invertible circulants when q = 2 and n = 83, but what if the cryptographer does not
want to work with 83×83 matrices in the encryption procedure? The cryptographer could increase
the value of q to decrease the value of n and still hit the minimum number of keys in the procedure’s
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keyspace. We will now look at the number of invertible circulants in our procedure when q = 16
and q = 64 (both powers of 2) and n is increased until |C∗n(Fq)| ≥ 1.2× 1024:
|C∗19(F16)| ≈ 7.0× 1022
|C∗21(F16)| ≈ 1.6× 1025
|C∗23(F16)| ≈ 4.6× 1027
|C∗13(F64)| ≈ 3.0× 1023
|C∗15(F64)| ≈ 1.2× 1027
|C∗17(F64)| ≈ 5.0× 1030.
We can see that our procedure hits the threshold number of invertible circulants when q = 16
and n = 21 and when q = 64 and n = 15, which are both much better than n = 83. But we still
need to see how the number of invertible circulants in the group grows when we use a prime other
than 2 and not just powers of the prime 2. Let’s look at the number of elements in C∗n(Fq) when q
is a constant and n is increased for q = 41 and q = 101:
|C∗14(F41)| ≈ 3.6× 1022
|C∗15(F41)| ≈ 1.4× 1024
|C∗16(F41)| ≈ 5.2× 1025
|C∗12(F101)| ≈ 1.1× 1024
|C∗13(F101)| ≈ 1.1× 1026
|C∗14(F101)| ≈ 1.1× 1028.
We can see that our procedure hits the threshold number of invertible circulants when q = 41
and n = 15 and when q = 101 and n = 13. When we plot the number of invertible circulants
versus the dimension of the circulants for q = 41 and q = 101, we see an interesting pattern
appearing. For both plots, as the dimension of circulant matrices increases regularly, the number
of invertible circulants increases linearly on a logarithmic scale; therefore, it increases exponentially
on a linear scale. If this is true, then our procedure would be invulnerable to a brute force attack
for a sufficiently large n because the number of invertible circulants for an eavesdropper to guess
and check would increase exponentially.
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It seems that the number of elements in C∗n(Fq) increases at least exponentially when q is
constant and n increases, but we still need to prove this. And to do that we need to show that the
formula’s direct product of the factors of the polynomial xn − 1 over Fq is at least exponential, if
not more powerful. But we cannot predict the factorization of this polynomial for all values of n
and q, so we will look at the sequence of the factors’ degrees for various values of n and q. Each cell
of the table below shows the degrees of the factors of xn − 1 over the field Fq when gcd(n, q) = 1:
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n=2 3 4 5 6 7 8
q=2 gcd 6= 1 (1,2) gcd 6= 1 (1,4) gcd 6= 1 (1,3,3) gcd 6= 1
3 (1,1) gcd 6= 1 (1,1,2) (1,4) gcd 6= 1 (1,6) (1,1,2,2,2)
4 gcd 6= 1 (1,1,1) gcd 6= 1 (1,2,2) gcd 6= 1 (1,3,3) gcd 6= 1
5 (1,1) (1,2) (1,1,1,1) gcd 6= 1 (1,1,2,2) (1,6) (1,1,1,1,2,2)
7 (1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,2) (1,4) (1,1,1,1,1,1) gcd 6= 1 (1,1,2,2,2)
8 gcd 6= 1 (1,2) gcd 6= 1 (1,4) gcd 6= 1 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1) gcd 6= 1
9 (1,1) gcd 6= 1 (1,1,1,1) (1,2,2) gcd 6= 1 (1,3,3) (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)
Let’s look at the cells in which xn − 1 factors into distinct linear factors over the finite field,
which are highlighted in yellow. In all of these cases, because the degrees of all of the factors are
1, the formula for the number of elements in C∗n(Fq) is (q − 1)(q − 1) · · · (q − 1) = (q − 1)n because
the sum of the individual degrees must be the original degree n. Then the number of invertible
circulants increases exponentially with respect to n, so these are the cases in which we know that
the factorization is exponential. It seems that this is the case not only when n = q − 1, but also
when n|q− 1, but we need to prove this. And to do that, we need to use the following proposition:
Proposition 3.14. A finite subgroup of the multiplicative group of a field is cyclic. In particular,
if F is a finite field, then the multiplicative group F∗ of nonzero elements of F is a cyclic group.
For a proof of this proposition, refer to [1, Section 9.5, Proposition 18].
Proposition 3.15. If gcd(n, q) = 1 and n|q − 1, then |C∗n(Fq)| = (q − 1)n.
Proof. Suppose that n|q−1 or q−1 = nk for some positive integer k. According to Proposition 3.14,
the subgroup F∗q of the multiplicative group of Fq is cyclic and has q−1 elements. Therefore, F∗q has
a generator α, so that all of the elements of F∗q are in the set {1, α, α2, . . . , αq−2}. Every element
of {1, α, α2, . . . , αq−2} is a solution to xq−1 − 1 = 0 by Lagrange’s Theorem. Let’s now look at
who solves xn − 1 = 0. One can check directly that the set {1, αk, α2k, . . . , α(n−1)k} solves this. So
xn−1 = 0 has q−1k = n solutions that are distinct. Therefore, if n|q−1, then |C∗n(Fq)| = (q−1)n.
We have now proved that in these cases, the formula from this factorization of xn − 1 is ex-
ponential, but we still need to prove that in all other cases the formula from this factorization is
at least exponential, if not even more fast-growing. And to do this, we will look at the minimum
number of elements that can be obtained from the formula of Theorem 3.12.
3.3 Universal Lower Bound on the Order
We cannot predict how the polynomial xn − 1 factors over the finite field when n - q − 1, so we
cannot predict the degrees of these factors to calculate the number of elements in this group. But
we can prove inductively that the universal minimum of the order of this group grows exponentially
for all values of n and q such that gcd(n, q) = 1. As a consequence, if the smallest possible size
of the group grows exponentially, then all possible sizes grow at least exponentially, if not more
rapidly.
The following proposition is a result of the basic pattern found in Theorem 3.12
Proposition 3.16. Let n ≥ 2. Consider the product ∏ki=1(qdi − 1) subject to the constraints
d1 + d2 + · · · + dk = n and di ≥ 1. Then the minimum possible value of this product is (q − 1)n
occuring when k = n and d1 = d2 = · · · = dn = 1.
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Proof. We will use a proof by induction. Let’s look at the first case when n = 2, then there
are two cases for the factorization of (q − 1)2: d1 = d2 = 1 or d1 = 2. In the former case,
(q − 1)2 = (q − 1)(q − 1) since d1 = d2 = 1. In the latter case, (q2 − 1) = (q − 1)(q + 1)
since d1 = 2. The minimum of these two cases is in the first case because q − 1 < q + 1, so
(q − 1)(q − 1) < (q − 1)(q + 1) Thus, the proposition holds when n = 2.
Suppose that the proposition holds when k = n, then let’s look at the case for n+ 1. We know
that d1+d2+· · ·+dk = n+1 and di ≥ 1, so we set the product P = (qd1−1)(qd2−1) · · · (qdk−1). We
wish to show that P ≥ (q−1)n+1. In the case when all di = 1, we have P = (q−1)(q−1) · · · (q−1) =
(q − 1)n+1. In all other cases, some di > 1.
Suppose that d1 > 1, then q − 1 is a factor of qd1 − 1. Then qd1 − 1 = (q − 1)(qd1−1 +
qd1−2 + · · · + q + 1). Thus P = (q − 1)(qd1−1 + qd1−2 + · · · + q + 1)(qd2 − 1) · · · (qdk − 1). Let
T = Pq−1 = (q
d1−1 + qd1−2 + · · ·+ q + 1)(qd2 − 1) · · · (qdk − 1).
It must be true that qd1−1 + qd1−2 + · · · + q + 1 > qd1−1 − 1. So we have that T > (qd1−1 −
1)(qd2 − 1) · · · (qdk − 1). But this falls into the case for k = n, so T > (q − 1)n by the inductive
hypothesis. If we multiply both sides by q − 1, then we have P = (q − 1)T > (q − 1)n+1. Thus, if
the proposition holds for n, then it holds for n+ 1. Therefore, the proposition is true for all n such
that n ≥ 2.
We have now proved that the number of invertible circulants increases at least exponentially,
if not more rapidly, as n increases and q is constant. Thus, our procedure is not vulnerable to a
brute force attack because it reaches the minimum number of keys in any keyspace without using
extremely large values of n or q. This means that our procedure is not only mathematically possible,
but it is also theoretically secure against a brute force attack. But before our procedure can be
implemented in practice, there are some more questions that need to be answered:
• Can we calculate the number of elements in C∗n(Fq) when gcd(n, q) 6= 1?
• Is the question of the conjugacy search problem actually impossible to answer or are there
weaknesses in our procedure that we are overlooking?
• Can we determine the number of elements in each of the conjugacy classes? Do these conju-
gacy classes significantly reduce the number of effective keys in C∗n(Fq)?
• Is our procedure vulnerable to other standard message attacks or to more complicated attacks,
like a man-in-the-middle attack?
Any future research relating to this thesis would need to consider issues such as these.
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